State of Utah v. Raymond Ortiz : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
State of Utah v. Raymond Ortiz : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randall Gaither; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Elizabeth Holbrook; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation















(THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 880378-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF TWO COUNTS OF 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, BOTH SECOND DEGREE 
FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-6-405, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, JUDGE, 
PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
ELIZABETH HOLBRROK 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
RANDALL GAITHER 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 880378-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF TWO COUNTS OF 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, BOTH SECOND DEGREE 
FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-6-405, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, JUDGE, 
PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
ELIZABETH HOLBRROK 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
RANDALL GAITHER 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
WAS PROPERLY ADMIITTED
 # 7 
A. Defendant Waived This Objection By 
Failing To Give The Trial Court An 
Opportunity To Rule On The Motion In 
Limine 8 
B. Evidence Of The Prior Convictions Was 
Admissible Under Utah Rule Of Evidence 
609, Subsection (2) 10 
C. Utah Rule Of Evidence 609 Subsection 
(1) And The Gordon Factors Support The 
Admission Of The Prior Convictions 12 
1. The Nature Of The Crimes - Nexus To 
Veracity 14 
2. Recentness Of The Prior Crime 14 
3. Similarity Of Crime Charged And Prior 
Convictions 15 
3A. The Distinction Between Gordon Factors 
Four And Five 16 
4. Importance Of Credibility Issue 17 
5. The Importance Of Defendant's 
Testimony To His Case 18 
6. The Balancing 21 
D. If The Trial Court Erred In Admitting 
Evidence Of Defendant's Convictions, 
Such Error Was Harmless 22 
POINT II: THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS DO NOT MANDATE 
THE REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS 23 
A. Defendant Has Failed To Carry His Burden 
In Raising This Argument 24 
B. The Jurors Were Justified In Considering 
Evidence Of Defendant's Convictions 25 
C. The Jurors Were Probably Not Influenced 
By The Prosecutor's Statement 27 
CONCLUSION 31 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES SITED 
Boston v. State, 185 Ga.App. 740, 365 S.E.2d 885 
(1988) cert, denied Sept. 8, 1988) 9 
Delonq v. State, 185 Ga.App. 314, 363 S.E.2d 811 
(1987) cert, denied 185 Ga.App. 909 9 
DeLeon v. State, 758 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14thDist.] 1988) 9 
Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 941 
(D.C.Cir. 1967) cert, denied 390 U.S. 1029 (1968) passim 
Luce v. United States, 105 S.Ct. 460 (1984) 19 
People v. Cook, 131 Mich.App. 796, 347 N.W. 2d 720 
(1984) 19 
People v. Perez, 515 N.Y.S.2d 303, 160 A.D.2d 595 
(2 Dept. 1987) 15 
People v. Von Everett, 156 Mich.App. 615, 402 N.W.2d 
773 (1986) 15 
Soto v. State, 736 S.W.2d 823, 827-828 (Tex.App.-San 
Antonio 1987) 9 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) passim 
State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984) 10 
State v. Blair, 227 Neb. 742, 419 N.W.2d 868 (1988)... 9 
State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984) 11 
State v. Dorton, 696 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1985) ... 24 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987) 12, 14, 
16, 19 
State v. Schwab, 409 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.App. 1987) 22 
State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521 (Utah 1983) 30 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) 25, 30 
State v. Trusty, 28 Utah2d 317, 502 P.2d 113 
(1972) 23-24, 30-31 
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973).... 24, 27-28 
State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988) 10-13, 
22-23 
United States v. Brewer, 451 F.Supp. 50 (E.D.Tenn. 
1978) 16 
United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1185 n. 8, cert, denied 
444 U.S. 1034 (1980), overrule recognized by 767 F.2d 
574 (1985), cert, denied 474 U.S. 953 (1953) 12 
United States v. Cueto, 506 F. Supp. 9, (W.D. Olka. 
1979) 16 
United States v. D'Agata, 646 F.Supp. 390 (E.D.Pa. 
1986) 16 
United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 
1981) cert, denied 451 U.S. 993 (1981) 12, 13, 
19 
United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1985). 19 
United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 
1976) cert, denied 429 U.S. 1025 (1976) 12 
United States v. Rein, 848 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1988)... 21 
United State v. Sims, 588 F.2d 1145 (1978) 17 
West Valley City v. Rislow, 736 P.2d 637 (Utah App. 
1987) 24, 27 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Rules of the Court of Appeals Rule 4(a) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 2, 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 1 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609 passim 
-iv-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
: Case No. 880378-CA 
v. 
: 
RAYMOND ORTIZ, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was convicted of two counts of theft by 
deception, both second degree felonies, and was sentenced on 
those convictions on May 10, 1988 (R. 72). Defendant filed his 
notice of appeal in district court on June 3, 1988 (R. 74). 
Under Rule 4(a) of this Court, and under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3, jurisdiction is proper in this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in 
admitting evidence of defendant's prior convictions? 
2. Do the prosecutor's comments mandate a reversal of 
defendant's convictions? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are 
provided as they arise in the text of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with two counts of 
theft by deception, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-405 (R. 
14). At defendant's arraignment, he pled not guilty (R. 17). On 
January 22, 1988, defendant was bound over to district court (R. 
2). 
Trial was held on March 31, 1988 and April 1, 1988 (R. 
27-30). The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of theft 
by deception on April 1, 1988 (R. 29). 
On May 12, 1988, the trial court issued an order 
indicating that the two counts of theft by deception would be 
thereafter deemed one count, and punished as such (R. 70). 
Defendant was sentenced to serve one to fifteen years in prison 
(consecutively to a prior sentence), and ordered to pay $10,000 
in restitution (R. 72). 
Defendant filed his notice of appeal in district court 
on June 3, 1988 (R. 74). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Reginald Corona, the fifteen year owner of Reggie's 
Rockin' R (T. 4), met defendant at Eagle Tire, next door to Mr. 
Corona's business, in approximately July of 1987 (T. 5-6). At 
that time, defendant told Mr. Corona that he had just bought 
Eagle Tire (T. 6), and that he had done so through a loan from 
the SBA (T. 7). After Mr. Corona expressed an interest in 
obtaining a similar loan for purchasing a business in American 
Fork, defendant told him that defendant knew someone who could 
get an SBA loan for him (T. 7). Mr. Corona said that he was 
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interested in a loan for between $350,000 and $400,000, and 
defendant told him that in order to get the loan, Mr. Corona 
would need to advance between $10,000 and $20,000 of his own 
money to prove that he would complete the loan procedure (T. 8). 
Defendant told Mr. Corona that defendant had advanced $10,000 to 
get defendant's loan, and from defendant's experience, with the 
exception of the "points", Mr. Corona would get all of his 
$10,000 back when he got the loan (T. 75). Mr. Corona then asked 
defendant to inquire with defendant's contact about obtaining the 
loan for Mr. Corona (T. 8). 
A few days later, defendant and Mr. Corona had a 
private meeting in which defendant indicated that his contact for 
the loan would arrange for the loan (T. 9). It was agreed that 
defendant would transfer the necessary documents between the 
contact and Mr. Corona (T. 10). Defendant never told Mr. Corona 
the contact's name, but did inform him that the contact 
supervised the SBA loan department at Valley Bank (T. 9-10). 
Later, defendant contacted Mr. Corona and said that he 
needed $5,000 in advanced fees in order to complete the paperwork 
for the loan (T. 10). Defendant asked that the $5,000 be 
delivered to him in cash (T. 11). Mr. Corona got a cashier's 
check for $5,000 from Tracy Collins Bank, making it payable to 
defendant (T. 11-13). When Mr. Corona later inquired, defendant 
assured him that he had received the check, and that he had 
spoken with the contact at Valley Bank (T. 15). 
In August of 1987, Mr. Corona had his son deliver 
another check to defendant, because defendant had told him that 
another $5,000 would enable defendant and his contact to send the 
loan papers to Denver (T. 15-17). Mr. Corona wrote the second 
cashier's check to Richard L. Gray (T. 18) because that name was 
on the Valley Bank business card attached to the blank (T. 52) 
loan papers defendant gave Mr. Corona to sign (T. 20). The 
rooming after the second check was delivered to defendant, 
defendant told Mr. Corona that Mr. Gray did not want his name 
involved in the transaction, and that Mr. Corona should write a 
substitute check, making it payable to defendant (T. 25-26). 
When Mr. Corona provided the substitute check, defendant told him 
he would guarantee the SBA loan (T. 27). 
Some time after the delivery of the third check, Mr. 
Corona spoke with defendant, who told him he needed a co-signer 
on a loan to purchase Eagle Tire, a loan and transaction that 
defendant had told Mr. Corona on the first day they met had 
already gone through (T. 28). This aroused Mr. Corona's 
suspicions, and he called Richard Gray at Valley Bank, only to 
discover that Mr. Gray had no record of any loan application from 
Mr. Corona (T. 29). 
Mr. Corona inquired further of defendant concerning his 
money and the loan, and defendant wrote a check to Mr. Corona for 
$10,000, but there were no funds in the account drawn on to cover 
the check (T. 63). When Mr. Corona informed defendant of this, 
defendant brought Mr. Corona another check for $10,000, which was 
also returned for insufficient funds (T. 63-64). One day, 
defendant told Mr. Corona that he was going right then to the 
bank to get the money to cover the check, but defendant never 
returned, leaving Mr. Corona waiting all day long (T. 64). 
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Mr, Corona never received an SBA loan as a result of 
the transactions with defendant (T. 27), and never recovered his 
$10,000 from defendant (T. 32). 
Defendant also introduced Mr. Corona to a woman from 
Atlanta, and told him that although the SBA loan was not 
obtainable, she (Gerry Hancey-Hedderick) had contacts overseas 
who would provide a loan (T. 42). Mr. Corona paid her $500 for 
her expenses (T. 45). Mr. Corona never obtained a loan through 
Gerry Hancey-Hedderick (T. 69). 
Richard Gray, loan officer at Valley Bank (T. 80), 
testified that standard procedures for obtaining SBA loans did 
not include applicant advancement of $5,000 fees, and that he 
received no loan fees from defendant or Mr. Corona (T. 85-86). 
Carl W. Warnock, commercial loan specialist for the 
Small Business Administration (T. 90), testified that he searched 
all SBA loan applications during the months of July and August of 
1987, and found none relating to Mr. Corona, to Reggie's Rockin' 
R, or to defendant (T. 92). He also testified that $10,000 in 
advanced fees it is not a prerequisite to application for an SBA 
loan (T. 93). 
Mr. Corona eventually obtained the SBA loan through a 
Mr. Hansen, who charged him a total of $500 for application 
assistance (T. 30-31). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant failed to obtain on the record a ruling from 
the trial court on defendant's motion in limine seeking to 
exclude evidence of defendant's prior crimes. Thus, he is in no 
position to object on appeal to the admission of the evidence 
which he introduced. 
If defendant were in a position to object on appeal to 
the admission of the evidence of defendant's prior convictions 
for theft by deception and for communications fraud, he would 
fail in doing so, because evidence of both convictions is 
automatically admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 609 because 
the crimes involve dishonesty and/or false statement. Were this 
not the case, evidence of the crimes would still be admissible to 
impeach defendant because the convictions bear on credibility, 
because the convictions are recent, because credibility is a 
major issue in this case, and because defendant had opportunities 
of presenting his case other than through his own testimony. 
The propriety of the prosecutor's comments during 
closing arguments becomes apparent through an overview of the 
entire case. The facts that defendant's prior convictions were 
discussed by defense counsel and the prosecution, and that these 
attorneys and the court instructed the jurors that the 
convictions were relevant only to credibility, and that the 
evidence against defendant was strong support the trial court's 





EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
On March 25, 1988, defendant submitted a motion in 
limine, seeking to exclude evidence of defendant's prior 
conviction for communications fraud (R. 25). During oral 
argument on the motion, the motion was extended to cover 
defendant's prior conviction for theft by deception (Pretrial 
Motions Transcript 3). 
The trial court took this motion under advisement (T. 
of pretrial motions of 3/31/88, 10), but there is no record that 
the judge ever ruled on the motion. Defense counsel was the 
first to elicit testimony concerning the convictions: 
Q. Now, you were — do you remember when you were 
arrested and charged for this situation? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And about when was that? 
A. November. 
Q. Of what year? 
A. Of 1987. 
Q. Now, prior to November of '87, had you been 
convicted of prior felonies? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And on or about June 27th of 1987, had you been 
convicted of a communications fraud felony? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And August 1st, 1985, had you been convicted of a 
theft by deception felony? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Had you ever communicated to Mr. Hansen anything 
about your criminal record? 
A. Yes he knew. 
Q. Did he know about that? 
A. Yes. 
(T. 127-128). Defendant's prior convictions were also raised 
during cross-examination by the prosecution: 
Q. And you didn't write out any checks before that 
bounced because you can't — was it your testimony that 
you can't have a checking account? 
A. Yes. [T. 124]. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. That was part of my parole agreement. 
Q. Parole agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you've been previously convicted of 
communications fraud in June of 1986; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Here in Salt Lake County? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then a little bit more than a year later — a 
little bit more than a year before, in August — a 
little less than a year before in August of '85, you 
were convicted of theft by deception? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. Both of those felonies? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Both of those involving crimes regarding 
dishonesty? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you are on trial today for what crime? 
A. Theft by deception. 
(T. 133-134). 
The jurors were instructed as follows: 
You are instructed that the fact that a 
witness had been convicted of a felony and/or 
convicted of any crime involving dishonesty 
or false statements is to be used by you only 
in weighing his credibility, and it is to be 
so used only if you find and believe that 
such a fact indicates a person is more likely 
to tell a falsehood. 
(R. 50, instruction 10a). 
On appeal, defendant challenges the admission of his 
prior convictions. 
A. Defendant Waived This Objection By Failing To 
Give The Trial Court An Opportunity To Rule On 
The Motion In Limine. 
Because the trial judge in this case took defendant's 
motion in limine concerning evidence of his prior convictions 
under advisement, because there is no ruling on the motion in 
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limine in the record, and because defendant was the first to 
present evidence of the convictions and did not object to the 
introduction of that evidence, he has waived any claim of error 
on appeal related to the admission of this evidence. See Delong 
v. State, 185 Ga.App. 314, 363 S.E.2d 811, 811-812 (1987)("The 
court made no ruling on appellant's motion in limine, and when an 
appellant fails to invoke a ruling on his motion, he has waived 
the issue for purposes of appeal.") cert, denied 185 Ga.App. 909; 
Soto v. State, 736 S.W.2d 823, 827-828 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 
1987)("Error in the admission of testimony will not be preserved 
by the filing of a motion in limine. Objection must be made on 
proper grounds at the very time the evidence complained of is 
offered and a ruling must be secured from the court."); DeLeon v. 
State, 758 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
1988)("the record does not show that either motion was presented 
to and ruled upon by the trial court. Therefore, appellant has 
failed to preserve this contention on appeal."); Boston v. State, 
185 Ga.App. 740, 365 S.E.2d 885, 887 (1988)("While both motions 
[to suppress and for severance] are contained in the record, we 
find nothing in the record to show that the court ruled on the 
motions other than a passing comment by counsel on his motion to 
suppress, made in connection with objections to State exhibits. 
Thus, there is nothing for us to review.") (emphasis added) cert, 
denied Sept. 8, 1988); State v. Blair, 227 Neb. 742, 419 N.W.2d 
868, 870-871 (1988)(because there was no record of a ruling on 
defendant's pretrial motion to suppress, and because defendant 
failed to object at the time that the evidence was introduced, 
issue of introduction of evidence subject of motion to suppress 
was waived on appeal). See also, State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 
46 (Utah 1984)(court will not rule on matters outside the 
record). 
B. Evidence Of The Prior Convictions Was Admissible 
Under Utah Rule Of Evidence 609, Subsection (2). 
In State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988), this 
Court defined the standard of review applicable in this case as 
follows: 
In reviewing evidentiary rulings, we "will 
not reverse the trial court's ruling on 
evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that 
the court so abused its discretion that there 
is a likelihood that injustice resulted." 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 
1987). 
Wight at 16. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him 
or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or 
false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
In State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988), this 
Court discussed subsection (2) of Rule 609, and the controversy 
concerning which crimes should be admissible thereunder. In so 
doing, this Court explained that some jurisdictions find that 
property crimes such as theft bear on a witness's credibility, 
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while other courts find that there is insufficient nexus between 
credibility and property crimes. This discussion repeatedly 
notes that even those courts which exclude evidence of property 
crimes for purposes of impeachment will admit evidence of those 
crimes if the crimes involve fraud and deception. IcL at 17-18. 
At defendant's trial, evidence was introduced showing 
that defendant had been convicted of theft by deception and of 
communications fraud, which are described as follows: 
U.C.A. 76-6-405. Theft by deception.—(1) A 
person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises control over property of another by 
deception and with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof.... 
U.C.A. 76-10-1801. Communications fraud. 
(1) Any person who had devised any scheme 
or artifice to defraud another or to obtain 
from another money, property, or anything of 
value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions, and who communicates 
directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or 
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty 
of . . . 
Inasmuch as fraud and deceit are essential elements of 
theft by deception and communications fraud, there is no need for 
the trial court to have made a factual analysis of the crimes to 
determine whether honesty factored into the crimes, and they were 
automatically admissible under subsection (2) of Rule of Evidence 
609. See Wight at 18; State v. Cintronf 680 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 
1984). 
C. Utah Rule Of Evidence 609 Subsection (1) And The 
Gordon Factors Support The Admission Of The Prior 
Convictions. 
It appears from the record that the trial court never 
had the opportunity of recognizing that defendant's prior 
convictions involved dishonesty and/or false statement, because 
after the court took defendant's motion in limine under 
advisement, but before the court ruled on the motion, evidence of 
the prior convictions was introduced by defense counsel. If 
defendant's convictions of theft by deception and communications 
fraud were construed by this Court as inadmissible under 
subsection (2) of Rule of Evidence 609 as a result of the trial 
court's failure to inquire as to the underlying facts of the 
2 3 
crime, they should be found admissible under subsection (1). 
_ Tracing the five factors to be considered in evaluating a 
609(a)(1) case to their origin, from State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 
1335 n. 44 (Utah 1986), to United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1185 
n. 8, cert, denied 444 U.S. 1034 (1980), overrule recognized by 
767 F.2d 574 (1985)(overrule recognition quoted in footnote 6 of 
this brief), cert, denied 474 U.S. 953 (1953), to United States 
v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976) cert, denied 429 
U.S. 1025 (1976), to Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 941 
(D.C.Cir. 1967) cert, denied 390 U.S. 1029 (1968), the State will 
refer to these factors in this brief as "the Gordon factors". 
2 
See Wight at 18 ("In this case, it appears that no inquiry about 
underlying facts was made. As a result, because we cannot 
determine if the actual crime involved dishonesty or false 
statement, we find that it was not admissible under 609(a)(2)."). 
This Court in Wight found the absence of record proof of the 
trial court's having applied the Gordon factors as an indication 
of error under Rule 609(a)(1), Wight at 19. However, numerous 
appellate cases support the State's current contention that the 
Gordon factors can be applied for the first time by appellate 
courts. See e.g., State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Utah 
1987)("Applying the factors we identified in Banner to the rape 
and escape convictions, we conclude that the trial court abused 
its discretion in refusing to suppress them. The State did not 
offer any discussion concerning the probative or prejudicial 
aspects of defendant's prior convictions. However, we find that 
the prejudicial character of the convictions outweighs their 
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As noted in Wight, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), explained the factors to be 
considered in evaluating the admissibility of evidence under 
subsection (1) of Rule of Evidence 609: 
[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on 
the character for veracity of the witness. 
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the 
prior conviction . . . . 
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to 
the charged crime, insofar as a close 
resemblance may lead the jury to punish the 
accused as a bad person. 
[4] the importance of credibility issues 
in determining the truth in a prosecution 
tried without decisive nontestimonial 
evidence.... 
[5] the importance of the accused's 
testimony, as perhaps warranting the 
exclusion of convictions probative of the 
accused's character for veracity... 
Banner at 1334 (footnote omitted). 
Particularly when these factors are applied in this 
case and compared with applications of the factors in other 
cases, it becomes apparent that defendant's convictions for theft 
by deception and communications fraud would have been admissible 
Cont. possible probative value and that defendant should have 
been able to testify in his own behalf without being cross-
examined concerning them."); United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 
1083, 1090 (7th Cir. 1981)(although trial judge did not 
articulate rationale for admitting the evidence, record 
demonstrated that Gordon factors were satisfied) cert, denied 451 
U.S. 993 (1981). 
Particularly in the circumstances of this case, in 
which the trial court was apparently never given the opportunity 
to deliver a ruling on the motion that he took under advisement, 
this Court should address the application of the Gordon criteria 
to this case, in the event that this Court seeks to analyze the 
admission of prior convictions beyond their admissibility under 
subsection (2) of Rule 609, in the event that this Court chooses 
to address the issue beyond recongizing defendant's waiver 
thereof. 
under subsection (1) of Utah Rule of Evidence 609 (as well as 
under subsection (2)). 
1. The Nature Of The Crimes - Nexus To Veracity. 
As discussed above, theft by deception and 
communications fraud are directly relevant to the credibility of 
a witness. Compare this case with State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 
1325, 1334-1335 (Utah 1986)("The crime of assault with intent to 
commit rape does not inherently reflect on defendant's character 
for truth and veracity.") and State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 
1037-38 (Utah 1987)("The crime of rape 'does not inherently 
reflect on defendant's character for truth and 
veracity....Likewise, the convictions for escape should have been 
excluded because of ... the complete lack of connection between 
the crime of escape and defendant's veracity."). 
2. Recentness Of The Prior Crime 
The convictions used to impeach defendant occurred in 
August of 1985 and June of 1986 (T. 133-134), and his trial took 
place in March and April of 1988. Certainly, the proximity in 
time of the prior offenses to the date of the trial substantiates 
the relevance of the prior offenses to defendant's credibility at 
trial. Compare this case with State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 
1335 (Utah 1986)("Particularly significant in our balancing 
process is the remoteness of the prior convictions... the 
convictions at the time of defendant's trial were between eight 
and nine-plus years old.") and State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 
1037 (Utah 1987)("The rape conviction was ten years old at the 
time of this trial. The conviction's remoteness is a measure of 
its negligible probative value."). 
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3. Similarity Of Crime Charged And Prior 
Convictions 
Of course, defendant's prior conviction for theft by 
deception, and the charge of theft by deception in the instant 
case are semantically identical. Because the factual bases for 
defendant's prior convictions of theft by deception and 
communications fraud were not discussed during the hearing on the 
motion in limine, or at any other time during defendant's trial, 
and because the statutory language defining those crimes 
encompasses a broad scope of behavior, it is difficult to say 
that defendant's prior convictions closely resembled the theft by 
deception at issue in this case, and led the jury to "punish the 
accused as a bad person.11 See People v. Perez, 515 N.Y.S.2d 303, 
303, 160 A.D.2d 595 (2 Dept. 1987)(defendant was charged with 
criminal possession of a firearm, and prosecution properly 
introduced evidence of prior convictions for attempted robbery: 
"Moreover, since the facts of the instant crime and of the prior 
crime were not similar, we find that the court's ruling did not 
prevent the defendant from testifying at trial."); People v. Von 
Everett, 156 Mich.App. 615, 402 N.W.2d 773, 775 (1986)("Those 
crimes [breaking and entering, uttering and publishing] were not 
substantially similar to the charged offense [armed robbery], nor 
did they involve substantially the same conduct for which 
defendant was on trial.") (brackets added); State v. Banner, 717 
P.2d 1325, 1335 (Utah 1986)(defendant was charged with sodomy on 
a child and sexual abuse of a child; H[t]he two convictions were 
for assault with intent to commit rape. Such convictions would 
be extremely prejudicial and tend to inflame the jury in any case 
15-
dealing with sex crimes, particularly sex crimes involving a 
child."). 
3A. The Distinction Between Gordon Factors 
Four And Five. 
The fourth and fifth factors in the 609(a)(1) analysis, 
-the importance of credibility issues in determining the truth in 
a prosecution tried without decisive nontestimonial evidence" 
and "the importance of the accused's testimony, as perhaps 
warranting the exclusion of convictions probative of the 
accused's character for veracity" appear to be merged in Banner 
4 
and Gentry. While, in some cases, these factors weigh equally, 
and cancel each other out, reference to decisions from other 
jurisdictions demonstrates that these two factors are 
Banner at 1335 ("Finally, the accused's testimony and the 
importance of credibility in this case were critical in 
determining whose version of the facts was correct since the 
prosecution's case included no decisive nontestimonial 
evidence."); Gentry at 1037-1038 ("Finally, the State relied 
heavily upon the testimonial evidence offered by the victim to 
establish defendant's guilt. Defendant's testimony would have 
been probative regarding the victim's credibility and possibly 
influential in the trial's outcome."). 
5 
See United States v. Cueto, 506 F. Supp. 9, 14 (W.D. Olka. 
1979)("Factors four and five seem to counterbalance each other in 
this case. While Defendant's testimony may be of some 
importance, a factor favoring nonadmission, at the same time his 
credibility may be a central issue in this case, a factor 
favoring admission."); United States v. Brewer, 451 F.Supp. 50, 
54 (E.D.Tenn. 1978)("Factors four and five seem to counterbalance 
each other in this case. While defendant's testimony may be of 
some importance, a factor favoring nonadmission, at the same time 
his credibility may be a central issue in the case, a factor 
favoring admission."); United States v. D'Aqata, 646 F.Supp. 390, 
393 (E.D.Pa. 1986)("Both sides agree that D'Agata's credibility, 
should he testify, will be a crucial issue. The main evidence 
against D'Agata is the testimony of a witness who claims he 
discussed buying the stolen goods from defendant. Thus, the 
credibility issue is central and D'Agata's testimony would be 
important, which are considerations for both admitting and 
excluding the evidence from each side's point of view."). 
_i c_ 
distinguishable from one another, and further support the 
admission of defendant's convictions in the instant case. 
4. Importance Of Credibility Issue 
In cases in which credibility is crucial (i.e. cases 
lacking independent physical evidence, cases in which the 
prosecution and defense cases hinge on testimony of conflicting 
witnesses), the admission of prior convictions bearing on witness 
credibility is essential. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 
936, 941 (D.C.Cir. 1967)("[the prior conviction] was received 
because the case had narrowed to the credibility of two 
persons — the accused and his accuser — and in those 
circumstances there was greater, not less, compelling reason for 
exploring all avenues which would shed light on which of the two 
witnesses was to be believed. The jurors saw and heard both and 
we are able to see and hear neither.") cert, denied 390 U.S. 1029 
(6th Cir. 1968); United State v. Sims, 588 F.2d 1145, 1150 
(1978)(after citing the five Gordon factors, the court noted that 
the trial court's ruling admitting the evidence was based in part 
on the fact that "defendant's credibility was 'essentially the 
whole case'"). 
In the instant case, the physical evidence consisted of 
originals and copies of the $5,000 cashier's checks from Mr. 
Corona to defendant and Richard L. Gray, business cards for 
Richard L. Gray and Gerry Hancey-Hedderick, a check from 
defendant to Mr. Corona for $10,000, some blank loan applications 
similar to those given to Mr. Corona by defendant, and a piece of 
paper with some addresses on it (see Exhibits envelope). The 
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significance of this physical evidence in the evaluation of 
defendant's intent is dependent upon the conflicting testimony of 
defendant and Mr. Corona. Because this case focused on the 
conflicts between these two witnesses, the fourth factor of 
Gordon supports the admission of defendant's prior convictions. 
5. The Importance Of Defendant's Testimony To 
His Case. 
This Court can better understand the fifth factor, "the 
importance of the accused's testimony, as perhaps warranting the 
exclusion of convictions probative of the accused's character for 
veracity" after referring to the rationale behind it: 
One important consideration is what the 
effect will be if the defendant does not 
testify out of fear of being prejudiced 
because of impeachment by prior convictions. 
Even though a judge might find that the prior 
convictions are relevant to credibility and 
the risk of prejudice to the defendant does 
not warrant their exclusion, he may 
nevertheless conclude that it is more 
important that the jury have the benefit of 
the defendant's version of the case than to 
have the defendant remain silent out of fear 
of impeachment. . . . 
Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-941 (D.C.Cir. 1967) 
cert, denied 390 U.S. 1029 (1968). Thus, cases following the 
The court in Gordon recommended that the application of the 
five factor test follow a pretrial hearing at which the trial 
judge 
is to have the accused take the stand in a non-jury 
hearing and elicit his testimony and allow cross 
examination before resolving the [Rule 609] issue. Not 
only the trial judge, but both counsel, would then be 
in a better position to make decisions concerning the 
impeachment issue. Of course, the defendant could not 
be compelled to give testimony in the non-jury hearing 
and his testimony would not be admissible in evidence 
except for impeachment. 
Id. at 941. 
The application of the fifth factor of this test on appeal in 
-18-
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of credibility w<e' a centra] issue, thus increasing the 
importance of impeachment e Mi n e r | i_LM J L. d^ illijed ,|'"1' " ^ 
( i ',M" ' , , People v. Cook, M i it, l\\ \ 1(^ r 1 i n b w " " 15 
( 1 984 || * Cei lain ly, defendants will feel, that the prosecutor 
b e i HI i j i j i i ' i in in i i in in in 11 in i I  i i p j 11 > II 11 i "Mi i in i1 mi III il 11 il I n • i i H I i 1 i o n Hii i n 11 
onlj to satisfy l.he dj petite el the prosecutoi but also to be 
hurled against the defendant if the defendant testifies. 
H o w e i i e i II In i i i i n ' t i in i i i o i n t w l l l n l in i I o j r i l i j d II , II I I I I III i i iJ II \\\ t i i: 
er Crawford which requires the trial court to ascertain 
whether there are alternative me*H~^« by which the defendant can 
pi eie ii I < i iln I i >n { w i \ \u in I Ii. i L i i-" u i I y ] , 
Cont this j u r i s d u t i o n is somewhat questionable,, i nasmuch as 
Gentry ha& set no pretrial hearing standard, but has set as a 
prerequisite to appeal of Rule 609 issues testimony by the 
defendant. Jld. at 1036. Thus, the Gordon court's concern about 
a Rule 609 evidentiary ruling's preventing a defendant from 
testifying will no longer be a fact in any appeal before this 
Court. See Luce v. United States, 105 S.Ct. 460 n.5 
(1984)("Requiring a defendant to make a proffer of testimony is 
no answer; his trial testimony could, for any number of reasons, 
differ from the proffer.")? United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 
574, 578 (9th Cir. 1985)("At the time of Givens' trial, the law 
of this circuit required that the defendant do two things to 
preserve the issue for review: (l)establish on the record that 
he will in fact take the stand and testify if his challenged 
prior convictions are excluded, and (2) sufficiently outline tlte 
nature of his anticipated testimony so that the trial court and 
reviewing court can perform the balancing required by Rule 
609«... Luce expressly overruled Cook on this point. Luce ] 015 
S.Ct at 463 N.3 M) cert, denied, 474 U.S 953 (1985), 
The gist of defendant's testimony at trial was that he 
was an assistant to the manager of Eagle Tire, Rick Hansen, who 
was the person responsible for Mr. Corona's loss (T. 129-130). 
Specifically, he testified that Mr. Hansen directed defendant to 
have Mr. Corona rewrite the check initially made payable to 
Richard L. Gray (T. 119), wrote the first $10,000 bouncing 
reimbursement check to Mr. Corona (T. 133), was present when both 
the checks from Mr. Corona were cashed (T. 117-118)/ and met with 
Mr. Corona numerous times (T. 125). 
At the time of trial/ defendant was aware of Mr. 
Hansen's location/ but chose not to call him as a witness (T. 
134-135). 
Defendant also testified that Gerry Hancey-Hedderick 
and her cohort Eddie Stevens were brought in on the loan 
arrangements by Mr. Hansen, and that they attended some of the 
meetings with Mr. Corona and Mr. Hansen (T. 122-123/ 134). 
Defendant testified that he had tried to reach Gerry Hancey-
Hedderick during August/ but that the telephone numbers were "no 
good", and that he had made no further efforts to present her 
testimony at trial. 
Defendant was able to cross-examine Mr. Corona (T. 32-
68; 75-79)/ and was able to present impeachment evidence against 
Mr. Corona through defendant's fatherf who testified that Mr. 
Corona had called defendant's father and characterized the 
$10/000 transaction as a loan from Mr. Corona to defendant (T. 
104). Defendant was also able to present evidence that when Mr. 
Corona contacted Mr. Gray at Valley Bank to find that his loan 
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defendant "s piiui convictions, 
6. The Balancing, 
1 mi II f i II I in 111 in mi IIi mi I I II i b o r d o n J a t 1 o i 1 1 1 I II 11 i i | 11 1 I 11 
e v e n t t h a t t i n s Count does not doom I he Iill9 i s s u e wa ived , or f i n d 
t h e evidortoo in q u e s t i o n a d m i s s i b l e linden s u b s e c t i o n f ? | nl I I I 
r i J 1 1 « i II I II II I 1 1 II II II III i III i i in III i III i 1 1 in mi 111 i in i ill II II i in 11 > I . 1 1 in I II i o • o w II t II II 1 1 1 h e i L i i J J I d 
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Fo r exampl en i n U . S . v . Fu ' ~:~ ~~ " J ; 
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i n t e :i 11 t :: d i s t r i b u t e a c o n t r o ] 1 ed s u b s t a nee , "J"' h a ti e v e n 111 C i r c u i t 
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The court found that the prior conviction 
would be si gnifleant to impeach the 
defendant's testimony suggesting that he had 
not engaged in this type of activity before. 
The court acknowledged that the conviction, 
nine and a half years earlier, was very 
remote in time. As to the defendant's 
subsequent history, the record reflected only 
that the defendant had used small amounts of 
marijuana before he was charged here, and on 
the positive side, he had married, had been 
regularly employed, and was raising a family. 
The district court found that there was some 
similarity between the earlier conviction 
for delivery of a controlled substance and 
the current charge of attempted possession 
with intent to distribute. Because the 
"critical element" in this case was the 
defendant's mental state when he was in 
Johansen's house on May 22, the court found 
that the defendant's testimony was important, 
and because the case came down to the 
defendant's word against Johansen's, the 
defendant's credibility was "extremely 
important." 
Id. at 782-783. See also State v. Schwab, 409 N.W.2d 876, 
(Minn.App. 1987)(in trial of sex offense charge, defendant's 
prior conviction for sex offense was admissible; nexus to 
credibility was sufficient, conviction was one year old, 
credibility was a key issue in the case, and defendant "'made no 
offer of proof to show what, if anything, more he would testify 
about that was not already before the jury.'"). 
D. If The Trial Court Erred In Admitting Evidence 
Of Defendant's Convictions, Such Error Was Harmless. 
In the event that this Court chooses to overlook 
defendant's waiver of this issue, and follow the format in State 
7 
v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988)' harmless error analysis 
will support the admission of defendant's convictions. The 
evidence presented at trial, as discussed in the statement of 
See footnotes 1 and 2 of this brief. 
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been d i f f e r e n t i f t h e e v i d e n c e had been e x c l u d e d ,
 rnul t h e r e f o r e , 
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POINT I I 
THE \~ ?Ecr:oF s . rs ro N, r MANDATE THE 
REVER:-* ' ' E^ 'FNl/ .
 fc- CONVICTIONS. 
^^i*^ wlosifiy -* ^ uiUunts, t:*c iwllowing comments were 
[MR. IWASAKI]: The fact that a witness has been 
convicted of a felony and/or convicted of a crime 
involving dishonest or false statement i s to be used by 
you only i n weighing his credibility, 
I'm not saying, "Find Mr. Ortez guilty of thef t 1: y 
deception because he's previously been convicted of 
theft by deception, and he's previously been convicted 
of a communications fraud." 
Even though the dates of those convictions are ] ess 
than a year apar t in 1985, ai id 1986, and now, 1 le s also 
charged in 1987 with identical crimes, that is not the 
purpose of the felony convictions. That is to be used 
only if you find and believe that such a fact 
indicates a person is more likely to te] 1 a falsehood,. 
To question his credibility. 
I've heard other arguments i i I other cases where it 
says, "Well, look if he gets on the stand and has to 
admit to those felonies and take the risk of being 
convicted on that, he must be telling the truth." 
Well, he obviously didn't change his behavior from ] 985 
to '86. 
MR. GAITHER: 1 ^ .» ^ wi;.-:; to object,, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained, 
MR. IWASAKI: The testimony is not believable, . 
is a basis for you to look at the prior felony 
convictions • 
(T. 151- 152) 
T l l e mi i mi 1 1 1 1 mi i| mi i i n I t " i l l i i i i n mi i i mi i in in i i i 
that these comments warrant a reversal ot defendant's convict inn 
is set forui in State v i i mi iiji( ztt utah2d 317, 502 P.2d iI3 
( 
Because of his advantaged position in 
proximity to the trial, and his 
responsibility of seeing that the 
proceeedings are carried on in the way which 
will best serve their purpose of seeking the 
truth and doing justice by seeing that both 
sides are given a fair trial, the 
determination of the propositions just stated 
is primarily within the discretion of the 
trial court. And the reviewing court should 
not reverse unless it appears that clearly 
abused his discretion. 
Id. at 114. 
This Court explained the two questions that this Court 
should use in evaluating defendant's claim that prosecutor's 
comments justify a reversal of defendant's convictions, in West 
Valley City v. Rislow# 736 P.2d 637 (Utah App. 1987): 
[1] did the remarks call to the attention of 
the jurors matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in determining their 
verdict, and [2] were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, 
probably influenced by those remarks. 
Id. at 638, quoting State v. Valdez, 30 Utah2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 
426 (1973). 
A. Defendant Has Failed To Carry His Burden In 
Raising This Argument. 
Inasmuch as defendant has failed to address the second 
question posed by this Court in Rislow, Mwere [the jurors] 
probably influenced by [the prosecutor's] remarks?", this Court 
may choose to reject the entire argument summarily. See State v. 
Dorton, 696 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1985)("In any event, appellant 
did not attack the evidence and did not assign insufficiency of 
the evidence as error. Under the generally accepted rule, any 
error such as that claimed by appellant here [improper statement 
by prosecutor] is harmless."). See also State v. Trusty, 28 
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t r u e , i e , u n l e s s bo th ul ILhose [Kiblow | p i o p o b i t J out d i e 
a f f i r m a t i v e l y shown, t h e r e s h o u l d be in mull reverte-il j 
E. "lliu JuiLMi . Weie Jl i i fat i l ioJ In C o n s i d e r i n g 
Ev idence l)t D e f e n d a n t ' s C o n v i c t i o n ! 
In S t a t e t » 'Ulliudii II 1 1 III ill I Ii 1 "lHI ' | „ t h e 
Court explained that I he allegedly improper tuiiuiienLb ol . *>e 
prosecutor should be evaluated in I hi- context of the entire 
a I " '" " " 11 <«I«< i in «• i' 
Whiie these remarks were arguably improper 
and ^al because the prosecutor 
mis law and made a representation 
of iact not. supported by the evidence, his 
comments, when placed within the context of 
his and defense counsel's entire arguments, 
fall within the ambit of permitted conduct. 
Generally speaking, in argument to the 
jury, counsel for each side has considerable 
latitude and may discuss fully from their 
viewpoints the evidence and the inferences 
and deductions arising therefrom. 
I d . at 'nl ill i| llh i i tno teh u n u t l e d | II'IIIJ lo liJ.ln]dn ifa ilii1 I IIIIJIIII-II iillhle 
from t h e I n s t a n t cast; b e c a u s e t h e r e , t h e d e f e n s e f a i l e d t o o b j e c t 
In I III i I in i i ul in ' f n I (it ement F , mil t a i l e d t o move fnn a 
m i s t r i a l , t h e t a s e does p a r a l l e l t ho i n s t a n t onp IIII t h e r e s p e c t 
t h a i In T i l l m a n , and in t h e i n s t a n t cahe , I lit- e v i d e n c e Hiiilijeit t o 
c I i i i I I f i n |i IIII i i i | i | i i in II iiiiii I I I I II |n e s e n t e i l 11 i|r i l e f e n s e r o u n s e l . 
Compare T i l l m a n , 750 I1, ('J Mill, dil Mill ( p o s s i b l e liei nil u I in bs oil 
p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment was min imized b e c a u s e d e f e n s e counsi I I i i I 
I a i se t J I l i e i i i i l l in i i IIII i i in | i II i u j i u | <i i ip j in i in I | e i II Ii II In i i«n i ulein i 
presented first by delleiiBe counsel: 
Q. Now, you were -- do y on remember w hen you were 
arrested and charged foi tin us situation? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And about when was that? 
A. November. 
Q. Of what year? 
A. Of 1987. 
Q. Now, prior to November of '87, had you been 
convicted of prior felonies? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And on or about June 27th of 1987, had you been 
convicted of a communications fraud felony? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And August 1st, 1985, had you been convicted of a 
theft by deception felony? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Had you ever communicated to Mr. Hansen anything 
about your criminal record? 
A. Yes he knew. 
Q. Did he know about that? 
A. Yes. 
(T. 127-128). 
It is also noteworthy that the same evidence was raised 
without objection during cross-examination by the prosecution: 
Q. And you didn't write out any checks before that 
bounced because you can't — was it your testimony that 
you can't have a checking account? 
A. Yes. [T. 124]. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. That was part of my parole agreement. 
Q. Parole agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you've been previously convicted of 
communications fraud in June of 1986; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Here in Salt Lake County? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then a little bit more than a year later — a 
little bit more than a year before, in August — a 
little less than a year before in August of '85, you 
were convicted of theft by deception? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. Both of those felonies? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Both of those involving crimes regarding 
dishonesty? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you are on trial today for what crime? 
A. Theft by deception. 
(T. 133-134). 
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Defendant's attorney, Mr, Gaitl ie:i :, a] so addressed 1; 1 i.-» 
issue of the prior convict i ons I n h i s cl osi ng argument: 
Dun ' L J 1:1 : :i s si tuation oi I the fact 1:1 112 ,t 
there was ii 1 i ] - - there were some bad 
checks i n v o 1 v 1 d; 1:1 :t! 31: e i, «.; a s a t r a n s f er o f 
funds, which is s ,. ::i i Il case, and then you 
have a person 1 lei; e 1 il .o has a prior record. 
That is the easy way out. That's the way the 
police decided to investigate this case; 
that's all Mr. Corona decided to tell the 
police, [b]ut your burden, as the Judge 
instructed, is to go through the evidence and 
look at the evidence. 
| 1 11 ' 1 '(in) | emphasis added to display the bimiiaiiiy between the 
prosecutor'L closing argument and comments of defense counsel!. 
T h e p i n i s c i 11I in ' 1 mi l in 1  1 1 1 «i 1 mi 1 1 1 iiiiiini mil I  1 1 in 1 I mi I h e 
issue of credibility. See Transcript y 144 | i'he farl I hat l lie 
defendant took the stand places a lot murh -- eliminates a let of 
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down to two essential elements: Who are you going to believe? ), 
Particularly in liijhl nt the facts that credibility was a central 
i s s u e I ill II II mi 1 1 1 1 ' I H I II II III in II II II in 1 1 1 in 1. mi 1 II in 1 i n 1 1,1 1 mi 1 ' in mi I 1 i u i i i 1 1 I 11 , 
d e f e n d a n t , d i s c u s s e d by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n 1, 1 i h nut o b j e c t i o n d u r i n g 
c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , and a d d r e s s e d by d e f e n s e n o u n s e l a i t e i 1 In 
a l l e g e d l y .1 unpi oi 1 1 iiiiimeiil |ijiiil iiiii H manner I 11 • 11 i s r e m a i k a b l ) 
s i m i l a r t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s | I I 11 fi Cour t s h o u l d d e t e r m i n e t h a t 
t h e p r o s e r u t or * h c l o s i n q argument d i d n o t bx i nq b e f o r e t h e j i m u s 
mil I 1*1 ;i 1 '^IILI lii wen, 11 i| pi ij 1 ie 1 i ui t l i n i r cons i de i a t 1 1 11 
C. The Jui'oiB Were Probably Not Influenced By The 
Prosecutor"B Statement. 
1 1 1
 W e s t V a l l e y C i t y v . R i s l o w , 7 3 6 P , ? i l l I  II1 ( I I I iilllli h\ \ 
1 9 7 I I I I In mi M f HI 1 1 d e l ii I l e i I I In I 11 fiiii 1 1 , 111111 Ii 1 I  I  11 111 1 1 mi I 1 | | I I I P S t 1 1 m 
p o s e d 111 ' v'a l i I •• wei v | t.lie )ui y members j , undei . t h e 
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by 
those remarks": 
[Conflicting or circumstantial evidence in 
the record would render jurors more 
susceptible to influence by improper 
argument. But if proof of defendant's guilt 
is strong, the challenged conduct or remarks 
by the prosecutor will not be presumed 
prejudicial. 
Id. at 638. 
While there was conflict between the State's and 
defendant's evidence, the following facts were undisputed: 
Defendant told Mr. Corona that he and someone else had recently 
purchased Eagle Tire (T. 132), and defendant knew someone who 
would help Mr. Corona get a loan to buy a business (T. 116). Mr. 
Corona gave defendant two cashier's checks for $5,000, so that he 
could obtain a loan (T. 129). Defendant told Mr. Corona that the 
advanced funds were to demonstrate Mr. Corona's intention to 
complete the loan transaction, to pay for application process, 
and to be refunded, minus the "points" on the loan (T. 8, 10, 15-
17, 75). Defendant received from Mr. Corona two cashier's checks 
for $5,000 each, which were used, with defendant's knowledge, 
consent and assistance, for purposes other than obtaining the 
loan (T. 118). 
While defendant steadfastly maintained at trial that 
Rick Hansen received all of the proceeds from the cashier's 
checks (T. 131), and that defendant was simply an innocent 
"middle man" (T. 130), defendant made arrangements to repay Mr. 
Corona, characterizing the $10,000 as a loan from Mr. Corona to 
defendant (T. 137-138). At trial, when the prosecutor asked for 
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r- ps A "* \r f" £i o \ v* rs*-\ =i 
everybody hargir . 
nrosecutor' <5 rnmjnPT _
 l(ere a? misstatement? * . ]aw 
^ ir.proper commer^ d^fenda: - i:ropersit': < or :jage : n 
crimin * I III 11 
rontext of -ritire argumert of prosecution ari 
def* 
j.,opixety oi pius^cuiui s comments, but. a J so 
[MR. IWASAKI]: The fact that a witness has been 
convicted of a felony and/or convicted of a crime 
involving dishonest or false statement is to be used by 
you only in weighing his credibility 
I #'m not saying# "Find Mr. Ortez g ail tj :: i: !i::l , = f t II: y 
deception because he '" s previously been convi • ::  I: = " ::I i: f 
tl i 3ft by deception, and he's previously been convicted 
:: f a communications fraud. " 
Even though the dates of those convictions IIH> 
less than a year apart in 1985, and 1986, and now, In 's 
also charged in 1987 with identical crimes, that is nut 
the purpose of the felony convictions. That is to be 
used only if you fi nd and believe that such a fact 
indicates a person is more likely to tell a falsehood. 
To question his credibility. 
I've heard other arguments in other cases where it 
says, "Well, look if he gets on thee stand and has tc 
admit to those felonies and take the risk of being 
convicted on that, he must be telling the truth." 
Well/ he obviously didrrt change his behavior from i^ltib 
to '86 
1 13R, GAITHER • 1 am going to object,- y • :: "' ,II 
Honor. 
Tl IE COURT: Sustained. 
1 IR 1 wASARI i. The testimony is not believable, 
and it is a basis for you to look at the prior felony 
convictions. 
in determining whether or not the jurors were probably influenced 
by the comments objected to. See State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 
527 (Utah 1983)("An improper argument by defense counsel, 
however, may be considered a mitigating factor in determining the 
extent of any prejudice that may have occurred."). Please refer 
to discussion of the repeated opportunities taken by the defense 
and prosecution to discuss defendant's prior convictions and 
credibility, supra pp. 24-26. 
Defendant allowed the prosecutor to discuss the 
convictions for some time before he objected, and then did not 
request an immediate cautionary instruction (T. 151). He waited 
until after he finished his own closing argument and the 
prosecutor finished his rebuttal to move for a mistrial (T. 174). 
These circumstances also weigh against finding prejudicial error 
in this case. Cjf. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-561 and 
561 n. 42 (Utah 1987)(failure of defense counsel to object and 
move for a mistrial constituted waiver of objection on appeal); 
State v. Trusty, 501 P.2d 113, 114-115 (Utah 1972)(lack of 
prejudice caused by prosecutor's question is proven by 
defendant's failure to object immediately). 
Finally, the possible prejudice caused by the 
prosecutor's comments was mitigated by the court's instruction. 
The jurors were instructed as follows: 
You are instructed that the fact that a witness had 
been convicted of a felony and/or convicted of any 
crime involving dishonesty or false statements is to be 
used by you only in weighing his credibility,, and it is 
to be so used only if you find and believe that such a 
fact indicates a person is more likely to tell a 
falsehood. 
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of law by b o t h t h e p r o s e c u t o r and t h e d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , and in 
I t q h t nt ilif «trf>nqth of t h e e v i d e n c e aqriiiiRf- de fendan t Lhxi> 
Cour t shvidld dtLeinujiL t h a i I "i |ui . i . i. f r IMI ' , ' 
i n f l u e n c e d i m p r o p e r l y by t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s comments in r o n v i c t i n g 
d e f pn i l i i n t . 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's prior convictions wore admissible under 
t 'i I 'liini Ill I I ! IM|| 1 llll i I In V 11" n t E v i d e n c e 6 0 9 . 
Particularly because ot defendant t (ailing In obtain . -rinr on 
the record tron 1 he trial courI ' cerning the admissibility £ 
i 
evidence should fail on appeal, 
Th i r Court «honld reooqnize that when the prosecute?" * s 
c o r a e 1 " 1 1 <•" '<"• i " j i I  in II in I IJI ii i ijijiiii-.Mii I "» i i i i I I n l , MI I I I I | In ''"l! i " in in 
light the entire arguments of both counsel, both ol wr-icn 
addressed the same relevant issue in veiy similar ways, the Issue 
of detendai I " i" ' i in • > « j " u|»u ly pi act "J l|iJl ' in 1 "" ] u \*. 
Because of the parity of defense and prosecution discussions ni 
thin fin iioi I nun n 1 r t 1 on" , hicininn1 nl l he* strength oi t hi'1 pv I dence 
against defendant , anil LUIIJUM' Uie jurors were repeatedly 
instructed about the proper use of evidence of defendant's prior 
convictions, this Court should find that defendant's case was 
probably not prejudiced by the prosecutor's comments. 
Defendant's conviction should stand. 
DATED this day of March, 1989. 
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